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Abstract
According to conventional home market eﬀects, free trade tends to shrink the market share for
the smaller economy in the diﬀerentiated manufacturing goods, and in the extreme, leads to
a complete hollowing out of the industry. In departing from the original Helpman-Krugman
modeling assumptions behind the home market eﬀects, we introduce technology diﬀerences
between trading partners and prove that the home market eﬀects will be oﬀset and will even
reverse if the small economy has better technology than the other country. We also prove that
even with identical country size, the intra-industry trade addressed in the existing literature
may not occur; it will occur only if the technology diﬀerential lies within a certain range that
is positively aﬀected by the level of transport cost.
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This paper aims at exploring the eﬀect of technology advantage on the conventional home
market eﬀects, initially raised by Krugman (1979). In a monopolistic competition model,
Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) illustrate the home market eﬀects,
that is, a country with larger consumers will run a trade surplus in the diﬀerentiated products
characterized by scale economies. The illustration of the home market eﬀects in these papers
relies on a speciﬁc market structure and functional form assumptions, especially on Dixit and
Stiglitz’s (1977) preferences and ‘iceberg’ transport costs. Thus, a further development in
the literature has been to examine the robustness of the home market eﬀects under diﬀerent
modeling assumptions.
In a model of monopolistic-competition with many industries, Hanson and Xiang (2004)
prove that higher transport costs and more diﬀerentiated products tend to have more inten-
sive home market eﬀects. Davis (1998) illustrates that if the homogeneous good and diﬀer-
entiated goods face identical transport costs, then the home market eﬀect vanishes. Behrens
(2005) shows that the existence of non-traded goods may also oﬀset the home market eﬀect.
Head, et al. (2002) ﬁnd the reverse of a home market eﬀect exist in a Cournot-competition
model, in which varieties are linked to nations (rather than ﬁrms). This result is consistent
with those in Head and Ries (2001) who consider a model featuring perfect competition
and national product diﬀerentiation. A similar reverse home market eﬀect is also found in
a ‘reciprocal-dumping’ model by Feenstra, et al. (2001) who also consider varieties tied to
nations. Yu (2005) shows that if the consumer’s preference follows the form of a constant
elasticity of substitution between the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated goods, then the reverse
home market eﬀect may occur depending on the level of elasticity. More speciﬁcally, if the
1elasticity of substitution is less than one, then the home market eﬀects will reverse.
The existing literature on home market eﬀects ignores the diﬀerence in technology be-
tween countries. To focus on the role of a technology advantage for oﬀsetting or even revers-
ing the home market eﬀects, we will employ the same Helpman-Krugman-type two-sector
model (one homogeneous good with no transport costs, and the other diﬀerentiated good
with a positive transport cost) in the literature, but allow for technology diﬀerences between
countries in the diﬀerentiated sector. We prove that the home market eﬀects can be oﬀset
by the technology advantage of the smaller trading partner. In the extreme, a small but
technologically better country can have trade-induced expansion rather than a reduction in
its manufacturing sector. On the contrary, a big but technologically poorer country may end
in decreasing rather than increasing its share in the diﬀerentiated manufacturing sector. In
other words, the technology diﬀerence may lead to a home market eﬀect reversal, if the tech-
nology diﬀerence is large enough. In addition, we also prove that the higher the transport
costs, the less likely it is that a reverse home market eﬀect will occur. The implications of the
results for the core-periphery pattern induced by free trade are also analyzed. We show that
the technology advantage can help prevent a small country from being peripherized in the
diﬀerentiated manufacturing industry. We also prove that, even with identical country size,
the intra-industry trade addressed in the existing literature may not occur; it occurs only
if the technology diﬀerential between countries is within a certain range, which is positively
aﬀected by the level of transport cost.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 establishes the theoretical
model with cross-country technological diﬀerence, and solves for the equilibrium under both
autarky and free trade. Section 3 shows that the conventional home market eﬀects will be
revised due to the technology diﬀerences. Section 4 concludes the paper.
22 The model
Suppose that the economy comprises two countries, home and foreign (denoted by an asterisk
(*)), and that they are similar in regard to the consumer’s preferences but not necessarily
in their production technologies and size. There is only one factor of production, labor,
and thus the relative country size is measured by the labor force. Let L denote the size of
the world’s total labor force, of which γL (0 < γ < 1) belongs to the home country and
(1 ¡ γ)L belongs to the foreign. That is, γ denotes the relative home country size. As
usual, we assume that there are only two sectors: one a competitive sector which produces a
homogeneous goods (Y ), and the other a monopolistical competition sector which produces
a large unmber of varieties of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerentiated product (X). The homogeneous
good, which will be taken as the numeraire, is produced under constant returns to scale
technology.
The central assumption is that there is a positive (but not prohibitive) transport cost for
the diﬀerentiated product under free trade. More speciﬁcally, for the diﬀerentiated product,
the international shipment incurs a “iceberg” eﬀect of transport costs, that is, for t (t > 1)
units of the goods shipped, only one unit arrives. Thus, the domestic price of the imported
diﬀerentiated product will be tp¤, provided that p¤ is the producer’s price for the foreign
product. On the other hand, the homogeneous good is assumed to be costlessly to trade, and
both countries produce it after trade; with identical technology in this sector, this assumption
implies that the wage rates are equal between the countries.
Furthermore, we assume that all consumers share the same Cobb-Douglas preferences,
which are represented by the utility function shown below:
U = C1¡s
Y Cs
X, 0 < s < 1, (1)
3where CY is the consumption level of the homogeneous good, CX is the quantity index of the
diﬀerentiated products consumed, and s is the share of spending devoted to the diﬀerentiated

















, 0 < θ < 1, (2)
where n (n¤) is the number of products produced in the home (foreign) country, ci (c0
i) is the
quantity of the home (foreign) product i consumed by the home consumers, and 1/(1 ¡ θ)
is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of diﬀerentiated products.
Solving the consumer’s utility maximization problem yields the following domestic de-







where pi denotes the price of home product i , P denotes the price index for the diﬀerentiated
goods to be shown later, w denotes the nominal wage, and thus wγL represents the income
level for the home country. Similarly, the derived demand for foreign product i on the part









Correspondingly, we have the foreign consumers’ demand for the domestic goods, c¤
i, and for
the imported goods, c0¤













1¡θ tsw¤(1 ¡ γ)L. (40)












































4On the other hand, the production technology in the homogenous sector is such that one
unit of output requires one unit of labor input. Apart from the traditional setup, we assume
that there is a cross-country technological heterogeneity in the monopolistically competitive
sector. Let the amount of labor required to produce the quantity xi of product i be given
by
li = α + βxi, l¤
i = α¤ + β¤x¤
i, (6)
where α > 0 (α¤ > 0) is the ﬁxed labor requirement and β > 0 (β¤ > 0) is the marginal labor
requirement for the home (foreign) ﬁrm. Clearly, the technology diﬀerence is represented by
diﬀerent coeﬃcients of the labor requirements.
For ease of comparison, Section 2.1 starts with the autarky equilibrium. Then Section
2.2 analyzes the equilibrium under free trade.
2.1 Autarky equilibrium
For simplicity, we start with the equilibrium under the state of autarky, i.e., c0
i = 0. Under
the assumption of monopolistic competition, each ﬁrm will take the price index P as given,
and two equilibrium conditions should hold, that is, proﬁt maximization and the zero-proﬁt
condition. Note that the producer of a diﬀerentiated product has to commit α units of
labor as the ﬁxed cost and β units of labor as the constant marginal input. The proﬁt









The zero proﬁt condition requires that the average cost equal the unit price of pi. By means
of the zero proﬁt condition and equation (7), we can derive the equilibrium quantity of













For simpliﬁcation, we suppress subscript i in what followings.
The full employment condition requires that the labor supply equal the labor demand,
as in the home (foreign) diﬀerentiated sector.
sγL = n[α + βx], s(1 ¡ γ)L = n¤[α¤ + β¤x¤]. (9)
Making use of the equations (8) and (9) yields
nA =
(1 ¡ θ) sL
α
γ, nA¤ =
(1 ¡ θ) sL
α¤ (1 ¡ γ). (10)
Obviously, the superscript A is denote “Autarky”.
2.2 Free trade equilibrium
Suppose now that the two countries open their goods markets to each other. The market
clearing condition for each of the diﬀerentiated products of the home ﬁrms, say, x, requires
that x = c + c0¤. In other words, total supply x should equal the sum of home and foreign
demand, c and c0¤, respectively. By making use of equations (3), (40) and (8), the market






















θ¡1 sw¤(1 ¡ γ)L
φ2
, (11)












θ¡1, 0 < τ < 1.
6Correspondingly, we have the market clearing condition for each foreign good, x¤ = c0+c¤,





















θ¡1 sw¤(1 ¡ γ)L
φ2
. (13)
Note that as the homogeneous product sector remains active in both countries, the identical
technology and costless trade in Y ensure an identical wage rate between the home and
foreign countries. In other words, the home wage rate w should be equal to the foreign wage
rate w¤, i.e., w = w¤. By making use of w¤/w = 1, we can solve equations (11) and (13) to
































represents the technology diﬀerence between the countries. As we can see from equation
(16), the factors aﬀecting the technology diﬀerential include the ratio of the ﬁxed labor
requirement (α¤/α) and the ratio of the marginal labor requirement (β¤/β). Furthermore,
higher values of α¤ and β¤ and/or lower values of α and β corresponding to a higher Φ
indicate higher technology advantage for the home country, or equivalently a technology
disadvantage for the foreign country.
73 Home market eﬀects revisited
The conventional home market eﬀects, as derived by Krugman (1979, 1980), Helpman and
Krugman (1985), etc. state that a large country tends to have a more-than-proportional
share of diﬀerentiated industries, since with increasing returns, transport costs provide an
advantage for ﬁrms located in a larger market. However, as will be elaborated below, the
technology advantage can oﬀset or even reverse the home market eﬀects.
To analyze the role of technology diﬀerence for the home market eﬀects, we speciﬁcally
have to compare the number of ﬁrms both before and after the free trade takes place. That
is, nT ¡nA for the home country, and nT¤¡nA¤ for the foreign country. By using equations
(14) and (10), the trade-induced change in the number of home ﬁrms can be derived as











Similarly, for the foreign country using equations (15) and (10) yields











As already pointed out in the literature, the factors aﬀecting the home market eﬀects include
both transport costs and country size. However, according to equations (17) and (18), we
can see that, in addition to the transport cost τ and relative country size γ, the technology
diﬀerential Φ is also an important factor aﬀecting the home market eﬀects.
For simplicity, we will rely mainly on a geometrical approach to conduct our analysis.
For this purpose, the strategy used to analyze the trade-induced change in the number of
ﬁrms, i.e. nT ¡ nA, is as follows:
In the ﬁrst step, we use equation (10) to determine the geometrical relationship between
the country size (γ) and the number of ﬁrms under autarky (nA), denoted as Line-nA.
8Secondly, we use equation (14) to depict the geometrical relationship between the country
size (γ) and the number of ﬁrms under free trade (nT), denoted as Line-nT. Then, in the
ﬁnal step, we compare on the graph the diﬀerence between nT and nA under a given level of
country size, and check how the change in the technology diﬀerential will shift the nT line
before examining the related impacts.
3.1 Number of ﬁrms and country size under autarky (Line-nA)
The relationship between the number of ﬁrms under autarky, nA, and country size, γ, is





as done by Kikuchi (2001). Thus, equation (10) can be rewritten as follows:
nA = γ, (100)
which is represented by Line-nA as shown in Figure 1. Notably, there is a corresponding
line for nA¤, which is suppressed due to the symmetry setup. In the ﬁgure, the horizontal
axis represents the relative country size, γ, and ranges between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the
vertical axis represents the number of ﬁrms, n, and also ranges between 0 and 1. According
to equation (100), Line-nA is a 45± line. Id addition, corresponding to a given γ, nA can be
straightforwardly identiﬁed in the same ﬁgure.
Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from Figure 1. For the two countries with
identical technology and preferences, the larger the country (a higher γ) the greater the
number of ﬁrms under autarky. More speciﬁcally, for a smaller country, i.e., γ < 1/2 (the







Figure 1: Country size and number of ﬁrms under autarky
less than 1/2 (correspondingly, greater than 1/2 for the other large country). For the case
where γ = 1/2, that is, where country sizes are identical, the number of ﬁrms should also be
equal under autarky, with both shares equal to 1/2.
3.2 Number of ﬁrms under free trade (Line-nT)








Obviously, factors aﬀecting the equilibrium number of ﬁrms (nT) under free trade include
not only the transport cost τ and relative country size γ, as already addressed in the litera-
ture, but also the technology diﬀerential Φ between countries. The relationship between the
number of ﬁrms and relative country size under free trade, represented by equation (140),
can be depicted as Line-nT in Figure 2.
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to elaborate on some of the properties of
















Figure 2: Country size and number of ﬁrms under free trade
of the technology diﬀerence, and aﬀects the main results of this paper regarding the reversal
of the home market eﬀects.
Technology diﬀerential and the slope of Line-nT





(1 ¡ τΦ)(Φ ¡ τ)
> 1, if τ < Φ < 1/τ. (1400)
In Appendix 2, we prove that if τ < Φ < 1/τ, then the slope of Line-nT will be greater than
1, i.e., steeper than the 45± line (or Line-nA) as depicted in Figure 2. Moreover, if Φ = τ,
or Φ = 1/τ, then Line-nT becomes vertical, i.e., its slope is inﬁnity. It is worth noting here
that for the case where Φ < τ, or Φ > 1/τ (that is, the technology diﬀerential is big enough),
the equilibrium does not exist. This is because, in this case, the slope of Line-nT becomes
negative and its cross point with Line-nA corresponds to the country size beyond [0,1], which
is meaningless by deﬁnition.
Since Line-nT is steeper than Line-nA, we can see clearly from Figure 2 that there are
11three cross points: Point A is the cross point of Line-nT with the horizontal axis, point B
that with the nA line, and point C that with the horizontal line n = 1. The relative country
sizes corresponding to each of the three points are, respectively, γ0, γ and γ1, and will be
expressed mathematically later.
Now we are ready to elaborate on the eﬀect of trade on the number of ﬁrms, i.e., the
so-called home market eﬀects in the literature. This is done by simply comparing the level
of nT and nA under a given level of country size γ.
As is clearly seen from Figure 2, for a country with a size γ that is less than γ, trade will
result in a decline in its number of ﬁrms, i.e., nT < nA. On the contrary, if the country has
a size that is greater than γ, then nT > nA, implying that trade will increase the country’s
number of ﬁrms. Obviously, this result is consistent with the conventional wisdom regarding
home market eﬀects, except that the benchmark country size of γ may not be equal to 1/2
as in the conventional case. Indeed, as will be shown in the following equation, the extent
of the technology advantage will aﬀect the benchmark size of γ.
By using equations (100) and (140) and making nA = nT, the critical country size of γ
based on hte home market eﬀects can be derived as
γ =
(1 ¡ τΦ)
(1 ¡ τΦ) + Φ(Φ ¡ τ)
. (20)
Clearly, there are two factors determining the marginal country size: the technology diﬀer-
ential Φ and transport cost τ.
3.3 Revised home market eﬀects
The conventional home market eﬀect indicate that, in a two-country world, a relatively
smaller country tends to share a small proportion of the diﬀerentiated manufacturing goods.
That is, in terms of our model, the benchmark relative country size of γ is equal to 1/2,
12should the conventional wisdom regarding the home market eﬀects be correct. From equation
(20), however, this is the special case of identical technology between the countries, that is
Φ = 1.




¡[(Φ ¡ τ) + Φ(1 ¡ τΦ)]
[(1 ¡ τΦ) + Φ(Φ ¡ τ)]2 < 0. (21)
Since at Φ = 1, γ = 1/2, equation (21) implies that with Φ > 1 we have γ < 1/2, as shown
in Figure 3. An interesting result can be derived from the ﬁgure. That is, for a country of a
size greater than γ, even if it is smaller than the other country (i.e.,γ < γ < 1/2), free trade
will enlarge the number of ﬁrms in that country’s diﬀerentiated manufacturing sector.
A symmetric result can be derived immediately in the case where there is a technology
disadvantage. More speciﬁcally, if Φ < 1, then γ > 1/2, as shown in Figure 4. Clearly, from
this ﬁgure we can easily ﬁnd the case where, even for a larger country (i.e., γ > 1/2), trade
may reduce the number of that country’s ﬁrms, i.e. the home market eﬀects will be reversed,
if the country is not big enough (γ < γ). The economic intuition behind this result is that
the technology disadvantage will to some extent oﬀset the positive home market eﬀects for
a large country.
This feature is summarized as Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (Home market eﬀects under technology diﬀerences)
A technology advantage can oﬀset the negative home market eﬀects for a small country.
Even if that country, it is smaller than the other (γ < 1/2), once it has better technology
and is not too small (γ > γ), then free trade can enlarge rather than decrease the number of
ﬁrms in the diﬀerentiated manufacturing sector. On the contrary, a technology disadvantage























Figure 4: Technology disadvantage (Φ < 1)
14than the other (γ > 1/2), once it has poorer technology and is not big enough (γ < γ),
then free trade can decrease rather than increase the number of that country’s ﬁrms in the
diﬀerentiated manufacturing sector.





< 1.1 That is, in the case where Φ > 1, Line-nT becomes steeper and moves to the left
with a higher Φ, as is shown in Figure 5, in which Line-nT0 corresponds to a higher Φ.
The counterpart, i.e. the case where there is a technology disadvantage, Φ < 1, can
be depicted immediately in Figure 6 in which Line-nT0 corresponds to a smaller Φ. Since
∂nT/∂Φ > 0, and ∂(dnT/dγ)/∂Φ < 0, if Φ < 1, Line-nT should move to the right and
become steeper as Φ decreases. That is, Line-nT0 is on the right hand side of and steeper
than Line-nT. The economics meaning of this reault is as follows:
Proposition 2 The higher the degree of technology advantage for a country, the more likely
it is that the country will ease its size disadvantage (γ declines) and beneﬁt more from free
trade in terms of its the numbers of ﬁrms (nT increases more for a given country size γ). On
the contrary, the greater the technology disadvantage a country faces, the less likely it is that
country will beneﬁt from a trade-induced size advantage (γ increases) and will thus suﬀer
more from free trade in terms of a decrease in the number (nT decreases more, or increases
less for a at given country size).
An interesting implication from Proposition 2 can be derived immediately, when the
technology advantage is extremely high, i.e., Φ ' 1/τ. In such a case Line-nT becomes
almost vertical, and close to the vertical axis. Furthermore, even a very small country can


























Figure 6: Technology disadvantage (Φ < 1) eﬀect of a decrease in Φ
16capture the whole of the world market once it has an extreme technology advantage over its
trading partners.
3.4 Core-periphery pattern
Some interesting results regarding the core-periphery pattern arising from free trade can also
be derived by examining the ﬁgures. Figure 2, ﬁrstly, shows that under free trade a country
smaller than γ0 will lead to the extinction of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector, i.e., nT = 0
for γ < γ0, a case of a complete hollowing out or de-industrialization under free trade. For
convenience, we refer to γ0 as the threshold of peripherization, which can be derived by
letting nT = 0 as shown below:
γ0 =
(1 ¡ τΦ)τ
Φ ¡ τ + (1 ¡ τΦ)τ
. (22)
Secondly, we can derive mathematically the eﬀect of Φ on the peripherization threshold,





[Φ ¡ τ + (1 ¡ τΦ)τ]2 < 0. (23)
This equation states that the higher the degree of technology advantage, Φ, the lower the
threshold level of the periphery γ0, i.e., to become a trade-induced periphery in the man-
ufacturing sector, the country size should be even smaller. In other words, the higher the
technology advantage, the less likely it is that a country will become a manufacturing pe-
riphery under free trade. Proposition 3 summarizes the results:
Proposition 3 (A technology advantage oﬀsets the likelihood of trade-induced de-industrialization)
For a country that is small enough, free trade will lead to the extinction of the manufac-
turing sector that is caracterize by scale economies. However, with a technology advantage,
















Figure 7: τ < Φ < 1/τ
will decrease. The higher the degree of technology advantage, the less likely it is that the
country will be peripherized under free trade.
As noted earlier, based on the properties of Line-nT under the case where there is a
technology disadvantage (Φ < 1), a lower Φ moves Line-nT to the right and makes the line
steeper. It follows immediately that there exists a level of Φ, denoted as Φ0, such that the
corresponding threshold of the periphery equals one half, i.e., γ0 = 1/2. Mathematically, by
using equation (22) and letting γ0 = 1/2, one can derive Φ0 = 2τ/(1 + τ2).2 Furthermore,
by ∂γ0/∂Φ < 0, we have γ0 > 1/2 for all Φ < Φ0. Line-nT00 in Figure 7 illustrates this
case. Accordingly, if the country size is less than γ00
0, even if it is the bigger country (that
is, γ is still greater than 1/2), free trade will make the big country become a periphery
of the non-manufacturing sector. This implies that a big country may end up completely
de-industrialized due to free trade, provided that its technology disadvantage is suﬃciently
serious.
2See Appendix 3 for the mathematical derivation.
18In addition, by simple algebra it can be proved that ∂Φ0/∂τ > 0,3 implying the higher
the transport cost (a lower τ) the more severe the technology disadvantage (a lower Φ0) that
is required in order to have the big-country’s de-industrialization occur under free trade. In
other words, the transport cost plays a positive role in preventing a country with a technology
disadvantage from deindustrializing under trade. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Free trade can cause a large country to become fully de-industrialized, if its
technology disadvantage is severe enough. However, a higher transport cost will decrease the
likelihood of full de-industrialization arising from the technology disadvantage.
3.5 Intra-industry trade and technology diﬀerential
An interesting case worth noting is to examine how the diﬀerence in technology may aﬀect the
likelihood of intra-industry trade (IIT) in the diﬀerentiated sector, especially when country
sizes are identical across countries, i.e., γ = 1/2. The conventional IIT pattern is derived
on the basis of identical country size and technology. Here, we illustrate from that under
identical country size, the IIT will occur only under a given range of technology diﬀerential.
In Appendix 3 that, under an identical country size, the IIT will occure only under a given
range of technology diﬀerential. In the appendix we prove that
γ0

        
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        
Φ0 < Φ < 1
Φ = Φ0 = 2τ
1+τ2
τ < Φ < Φ0
. (24)
Note that, based on the deﬁnition of Φ which denotes the technology advantage for the
home country, the corresponding index for the foreign country denoted as Φ¤ should equal
1/Φ. Now, suppose that the home country has better technology, i.e., Φ > 1. As illustrated








net imports    net exports￿
Figure 8: Technology diﬀerential and pattern of trade
earlier, the home country will experience an expansion in the diﬀerentiated sector after free
trade. On the contrary, the foreign country will lose market share by decreasing the number
of ﬁrms in the industry. In the extreme, if a complete hollowing out occurs in the foreign
country, i.e., the case where γ¤
0 > 1/2 for the foreign country, then the trade pattern will
be such that IIT will not occur. It follows immediately from equation (24) that, in order to
have γ¤
0 > 1/2 so that the foreign country’s diﬀerentiated industry completely dies out after
trade, that country’s technology disadvantage should lie within the range τ < Φ¤ < Φ0, as
shown in Figure 8.
On the other hand, the foreign country can still have its industry surviving although the
number of its ﬁrms will decrease due to trade, provided that its technology disadvantage is not
too severe, i.e., Φ0 < Φ¤ < 1. By noting that the technology diﬀerence index for the foreign
country Φ¤ is just the inverse of Φ, we can easily identify several patterns of trade under
diﬀerent levels of Φ. In the case of IIT, a country with better technology (1 < Φ < 1/Φ0)
will be the net exporter, while the other country (by deﬁnition its technology index is 1/Φ)
will be the net importer. The range of the technology diﬀerential [Φ0,1/Φ0] as shown in
Figure 8 is positively aﬀected by the level of transport cost. That is, the lower the value of
τ, the larger the range of [Φ0,1/Φ0]. Proposition 5 summarizes the results:
Proposition 5 With identical country size, intra-industry trade occurs if the technology dif-
ferential (Φ) lies within the range [Φ0,1/Φ0] and Φ0 = 2τ/(1+τ2). Furthermore, the higher
20the transport cost (lower τ), the larger the range will be; the country with better technology
will be the net exporter of the diﬀerentiated goods, while the other country wiil be the net
importer. The technology diﬀerential beyond this range indicates that free trade will lead to
a complete hollowing out of the diﬀerentiated industry in the case of the technology disad-
vantaged country, while the technology advantaged country will take up the whole market.
4 Concluding remarks
The conventional home market eﬀects indicate that a larger country will tend to have a
more than proportionate share of diﬀerentiated industries, since with increasing returns,
transport cost gives an advantage to ﬁrms located in larger markets. However, this result is
derived under speciﬁc assumptions in the Helpman-Krugman model. By departing from the
standard Helpman-Krugman modeling assumptions, the home market eﬀects reversal may
occur under a diﬀerent set-up, such as where transport cost is considered in homogeneous
goods (Davis 1998), Cournot competition (Head, et al. 2002), the endogenous expenditure
share (Yu 2005), and national (rather than ﬁrm) product diﬀerentiation (Feenstra, et al.
2001, Head and Ries 2001).
However, most of the literature regarding the home market eﬀects still assumes identical
technology across countries. Theoretically, diﬀerences in technology can play an important
role in aﬀecting the trade pattern, as illustrated in the conventional Ricardian model. In
the Ricardian world, we can easily ﬁnd that the better the technology of a country in an
industry, the more likely it is that the country will be the major or only producer of the
goods, even though the country may be smaller than its trading partner. As a complement,
we extend the conventional home market eﬀects model to allow for diﬀerences in technology,
and illustrate that a technology advantage can oﬀset or even reverse the home market eﬀects.
21That is, a small country with suﬃciently better technology will result in the enlargement
rather than shrinkage of the diﬀerentiated industry under free trade.
The major ﬁndings of this paper are as follows:
(1) A technology advantage can oﬀset the negative home market eﬀects of a relatively
small country and enhance the positive home market eﬀects for a larg country.
(2) The larger the technology advantage of the smaller country, the more likely it is
that the home market eﬀect will be oﬀset, and in the extreme, lead to the reversal of the
home market eﬀects. That is, trade will induce the expansion of the smaller country in the
diﬀerentiated sector at the expense of shrinkage in the case of the larger country.
(3) For a country that is small enough, free trade will lead to the extinction of the
manufacturing sector characterized by economies of scale , i.e., there will be a complete
hollowing out eﬀect or de-industrialization. However, with a technology advantage, the
likelihood of being peripherized decreases. The higher the degree of technology advantage,
the less likely it is that such a country will be peripherized under free trade.
(4) After considering diﬀerences in technology, the conventional wisdom regarding intra-
industry trade in the increasing return sector should be revised. We show that, even under
identical country size, IIT may not occur if the technology diﬀerence is big enough.
Appendix 1 Derivations of the equilibrium number of ﬁrms under
free trade (nT and nT¤)
Instead of solving for n and n¤ directly from equations (11) and (13), we adopt the following
strategy. In the ﬁrst step, 1/φ1 and 1/φ2 are regarded as new variables and are solved from
equations (11) and (13) to yield 1/φ1 = φ0(¢) and 1/φ2 = φ0(¢). Secondly, the results are
22substituted into equation (12) to solve for n and n¤.
Step 1: Solving for 1/φ1 = φ0(¢) and 1/φ2 = φ0(¢)






wγ τw¤(1 ¡ γ)
































































































Step 2: Solving for n and n¤













































































































By using w¤/w = 1, the results can be simpliﬁed further as shown below: (The superscript
































represents the diﬀerence in technology between the countries.
Appendix 2 Derivations of the properties of Line-nT





(1 ¡ τΦ)(Φ ¡ τ)
> 1, if τ < Φ < 1/τ. (1400)
Proof:
Let τ < Φ < 1/τ. Suppose that
Φ(1 ¡ τ2)
(1 ¡ τΦ)(Φ ¡ τ)
· 1
) Φ ¡ Φτ2 · Φ ¡ τ ¡ τΦ2 + τ2Φ
) (1 ¡ τΦ) · Φ(τ ¡ Φ).
Obviously, this is contradictory to the presumption that τ < Φ < 1/τ. Q.E.D.









(1 ¡ τΦ)2 +
(1 ¡ γ)τ
(Φ ¡ τ)2 > 0. (A.9)





















(1 ¡ τΦ)(Φ ¡ τ)
¡
Φ(1 ¡ τ2)[(¡τ)(Φ ¡ τ) + (1 ¡ τΦ)]
[(1 ¡ τΦ)(Φ ¡ τ)]2
=
τ(1 ¡ τ2)(Φ2 ¡ 1)
[(1 ¡ τΦ)(Φ ¡ τ)]2
¸
< 0, if Φ
¸
< 1. Q.E.D.
section*Appendix 3 Derivations of the properties of the γ and γ0
1. The γ and γ0 decrease as Φ increases.

















, if Φ = 1. (A.10)







, if Φ > 1. (A.11)










, if Φ < 1. (A.12)
3. Let γ0 = 1/2. By using equation (22), we can derive a level of technology diﬀerential
Φ0 = 2τ/(1 + τ2), such that
γ0

        





        





        
        
Φ0 < Φ < 1
Φ = Φ0 = 2τ
1+τ2
τ < Φ < Φ0
.
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